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Mack E. Barham and Albert Tate, Jr.*
The mineral law of Louisiana is almost entirely a product of
jurisprudential development. The Civil Code was totally silent on the
subject of regulating the rights to explore for and produce minerals,
except for the provision in Civil Code article 505 pertaining to the
ownership of all that is above and under the soil, and to the owner's
right to make constructions below the soil in order to draw the bene-
fits. Neither the ancient jurisconsults who first formulated civilian
concepts, nor the Napoleonic scholars who drafted the provisions
which in many cases were adopted verbatim in our own Code, could
have imagined the nature and intricacies of the production of oil and
gas from under the ground. Nevertheless, the general concepts and
broad rules of our Code provide a wise and practical twentieth cen-
tury basis for principles regulating the private rights of the land-
owner, the mineral producer, and the holders of mineral interests.
Professor Daggett said, "The Louisiana courts deserve unstinting
praise for the formulation of the governing principles regarding min-
eral law. The meshing of the old articles of the code for traction in a
modern and peculiar industry was not an easy task."'
However, as Colonel Tucker points out in the article which fol-
lows, the jurisprudential development of the basic mineral law of
Louisiana was a result of reaching beyond the letter of the Civil Code
and applying the spirit out of which that code was born, to formulate
a solid civilian conception of the mineral servitude and the mineral
lease. He states that this development "represents, probably, the
most extended analogical adaptation of the civil law to modern cir-
cumstances." (Emphasis added.) How fortunate for Louisiana that
the court rejected the idea of a mineral estate subject to ownership
separate and apart from the soil. How fortunate for the landowners
as well as the industry, especially in light of the present energy crisis,
that the jurisprudence established the requirement that the owner of
a mineral servitude must use that servitude timely, or suffer the
extinguishment of his right of use as a matter of public policy.2
The jurisprudential development of the mineral law in Louisiana
is one of the best examples of civilian judicial methodology. Suddenly
confronted with legal issues that had to be resolved out of circum-
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stances never envisioned by the redactors of the Code, and without
specific pronouncement of legislative will but on the basis of code
concepts and analogies, the court fashioned on a case by case basis
the whole cloth of a most important aspect of Louisiana law. Louis-
iana, as one of the largest producers of oil and gas in the United
States, had to resolve quickly the perplexing legal problems in an
area where lawyers and judges were almost without guidelines. Most
amazing perhaps is the tenacity with which the Louisiana court re-
sisted the common law, and resorted to the civilian tradition for the
resolution of these problems. It says much for the court of the early
twentieth century that it did not, as had some previous courts, simply
adopt the common law because of the ease with which it could have
replaced the civil law in this area.
The evolvement of the mineral law over the years indicates the
court's awareness of new developments in that field and of the need
for flexible rules of law which could be adapted to changing condi-
tions. While the jurisprudence may not have laid a solid philosophical
base for the various rules of law which govern mineral rights, it has
at least left these rules of law open for growth and change. This
jurisprudence is a good example of the civilian tradition of looking not
only to the Code, but through and beyond the Code. It has to date
kept that Code and the mineral law alive and viable.
The court would be the first to admit that it is not designed to
create broad principles of law or reduce the philosophy of the people
into general statements of public policy, or to lay down broad under-
lying principles of law. However, in the field of mineral law, the court
was forced to act in these spheres of endeavor. A perusal of the doc-
trinal writing and general comment upon the fruits which have been
born of this judicial exercise, indicates strong, general approval of
that activity.
Perhaps, as Professor Daggett stated:
The history of legal thought cannot neglect the role of judge-made
law. Louisiana jurisprudence on oil and gas is a continuing trib-
ute to the patience, research, wisdom, and fairness of the mem-
bers of the bench of the state. The evolution in the hands of
judges of the present body of law dealing with one of the most
valuable property rights known in the state should restore the
confidence of every citizen in the democratic judicial process, if
such confidence has ever wavered.3
However, the judiciary has no desire to make law such as was
3. H. DAGGETT, MINERAL RIGHTS IN LoUISIANA XX (rev. ed. 1949).
[Vol. 34
1974] JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT 955
required of it in the formulation of the mineral law of this state. It is
preferable that the legislature lay down broad principles of law and
create the public policy reflecting the philosophical concepts of the
people. But civilian academicians, as well as the court, would
strongly urge that if the mineral law of this state is to be a part of its
civilian tradition, any legislative codification should lay down public
policy determinations and broad, general concepts whereby the court,
on a case to case basis, can determine justice between the parties in
litigation under particular circumstances.

